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Abstract—This paper describes the motivation, design,
analysis and implementation of a new protocol for critical
wireless communication called AirTight. Wireless
communication has become a crucial part of the infrastructure
of many cyber-physical applications. Many of these applications
are real-time and also mixed-criticality, in that they have
components/subsystems with different consequences of failure.
Wireless communication is inevitably subject to levels of
external interference. In this paper we represent this
interference using a criticality-aware fault model; for each level
of interference in the fault model we guarantee the timing
behaviour of the protocol (i.e. we guarantee that packet
deadlines are satisfied for certainly levels of criticality).
Although a new protocol, AirTight is built upon existing
standards such as IEEE 802.15.4. A prototype implementation
and protocol-accurate simulator, which are also built upon
existing technologies, demonstrate the effectiveness and
functionality of the protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Cyber-Phyical systems (CPS) require some form of
wireless communication and contain components/subsystems
of different levels of criticality. In this paper we derive,
implement and evaluate a new wireless protocol (which we
call AirTight) that supports time-critical communication. The
particular properties of mixed criticality systems has led to
the definition of criticality-aware protocols and analysis for
Network-on-Chip (NoC) [6], [19] and CAN [5]; here we
extend this work to cater for wireless communication.
Unfortunately no existing complete protocol gives the right
level of support for event- and time-based communications
that have hard deadlines for packet delivery (see related work
in Section III). AirTight is a new protocol that is built upon
the physical and MAC layers of IEEE 802.15.4, a standard
for wireless personal area networks (WPANs), widely used
as the basis of protocols such as ZigBee and WirelessHART.
With wireless communication, it is not realistic to only
require that deadlines are met when there are no faults.
Rather, as in other considerations of fault tolerance, we
require that certain levels of performance are delivered when
the likelihood and severity of fault(s) is bounded by what is
referred to as a fault model. We assume that the physical
layer of the protocol incorporates the usual methods of
increasing resilience (for example spectrum spreading), and
we therefore focus on faults than manifest themselves as
unacknowledged frame transmissions at the MAC layer.
In this paper the analysis developed for AirTight allows
deadlines to be guaranteed at various levels of service,
corresponding to the severity of the fault model and the level
of service required by the criticality assigned to the packet
being guaranteed. Different fault models can be applied; the
basic behaviour of AirTight is not dependent upon any
particular fault model.
In the next section we discuss the requirements for which
AirTight was defined. We also give an overview of the
protocol and define some necessary terms. In Section III we
consider related work. Section IV describes the fault model
employed. Section V completes the description of the
AirTight protocol, and its analysis is given in Section VI.
The construction of the necessary slot table in addressed in
Section VII. An illustrative example is provided in Section
VIII. A prototype implementation and protocol-accurate
simulator are described in Sections IX and X, these are used
to undertake a number of representative experiments, as
covered in Section XI. Finally, conclusions are presented in
Section XII.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR, AND OVERVIEW OF, AIRTIGHT
We assume the CPS consists of a distributed system of
nodes that can each perform any combination of executing
tasks, producing/consuming data from sensors/tasks, and
relaying data packets to and from other nodes. There may be
a range of communication media within the CPS; here we
focus on the use of wireless technology. The required
wireless network protocol is assumed to have the following
properties (most of them inherited from the parent standard
IEEE 802.15.4):
• Peer-to-peer packet-switching communication between
tasks/nodes is the normal use of the network. Packets
are sent from a node to the next as one or more frames.
Each successful frame transmission is always
acknowledged by the receiver through the transmission
of a short ACK frame.
• Multi-hop routing is required due to the limited
transmission range of each node, meaning that some
packets are unable to be sent directly to their
destination.
• Buffers exist on each node to store frames in transit
(the size of the buffers required on each node can be
determined during the off-line scheduling process).
• The nodes have their clocks synchronised so the
maximum drift between any two clocks is at most
Terror.
• Nodes have line power, so energy efficiency/battery life
is not a limiting concern.
• Multiple frequency bands (channels) are available in
IEEE 802.15.4 (up to 16 in the 2.4GHz band) and the
standard is designed so that interference from one
channel to another is negligible. A node can only use
one channel at a time.
• Node communications are represented by two graphs: the
communications graph and the interference graph:
– The communications graph C: if there is an edge
from A → B in C, then the two nodes can
communicate directly. This is required to be a
symmetric graph due to the necessity for an
acknowledgement to be returned to the sender, so
A→ B implies B → A.
– The interference graph I: if there is an edge from
A→ B in I, then a transmission from A will prevent
B from receiving a frame from any node other than
A on that channel at that time.
It is assumed that the packets to be communicated have tight
timing constraints (i.e. deadlines). We also require that the
system supports applications of different levels of criticality.
We will, in this paper, assume just two criticality levels, high
(HI) and low (LO). The main distinction between these levels
is the number and duration of faults that they must tolerate
(see Section IV).
The distributed CPS consists of N nodes (n0 to nN−1).
Each node generates a set of packet flows (or flows), τi,
defined by:
• Period, Ti; the minimum time between packets.
• Capacity, Ci; the packet’s maximum size.
• Criticality Level, Li; a static parameter of the flow.
• Deadline, Di; assumed initially to be no greater than Ti.
• Destination,Desi; packets are assumed to be peer-to-peer
so there is a single destination for each flow.
• Source, Sori; there is an implicit source for each flow.
As part of the local scheduling, each flow is assigned a unique
priority, Pi.
We do not assume that the flows are purely periodic. This
implies that there must be some form of run-time scheduling.
However, we do not expect that centralised access control, or
token passing protocols can deliver the performance required
by a modern CPS. Any protocol that requires significant
overhead to agree on the next packet to send is unlikely to
meet strict timing requirements. The alternative of a fully
table-driven time-triggered protocol lacks the flexibility
needed to support event-triggered and adaptive applications.
AirTight is designed to balance efficiency and flexibility.
At the system level, its media access control is table-driven,
but at the node level it uses criticality-aware priority-based
frame scheduling. The protocol is based around repeating slot
tables which, in time, define the activities of each node – either
transmission or reception on that channel, or null meaning no
usage. The slot (or scheduling) table (ST) consists of a series
of slots. Each slot is assigned to a node and can be used by that
node to send a single data frame. The slot also accommodates
the ACK frame of the respective receiver.
At each node, local scheduling decisions are made to
manage the use of the node’s slot allocation. We employ a
fixed-priority scheme (although this is not fundamental to
AirTight). A set of FIFO queues (buffers), one per priority
level, are used to hold the frames that need to be transmitted.
Each flow has a unique priority and hence a specific buffer.
The frames from the same flow are stored in the buffer in
FIFO order. Whenever the node has a slot available, it
transmits the first frame in the highest priority non-empty
buffer. If an ACK is received the frame is removed from the
buffer; if no ACK is received, then the frame remains in the
buffer and is a candidate for transmission when the next
available slot for that node becomes available.
AirTight is thus a two level protocol. A collection of slot
tables defines the usage of the wireless media. Each slot in a
table defines whether the node can transmit in that slot (and on
which channel if more than one channel is used), or whether
it should listen in that slot (and on which channel), or whether
it is off-duty. The collection of tables reflects the properties
of the communication and interference graphs. So, within the
same channel, two nodes may, in effect, be allocated the same
slot if the interference graph fulfils specific properties with
regards to senders and receivers [16]. The protocol is described
in detail in Section V.
The fundamental time unit of AirTight is the duration (S)
of a slot – the time it takes to communicate a single frame
of data and receive an ACK for that frame. In our prototype
implementation (see Section IX) a slot length of 10ms has
been achieved, although a longer slot was used in experiments
to aid collection of measurement data. All parameters of the
application, the communication media and the environment
(e.g. Ti, Ci, Di, table length, fault models, etc.) are expressed
as an integer number of slot times. We assume that clock drift
is insignificant when compare to the slot duration: Terror ≪ S.
A. An Avionics Use-case
An aircraft engine is a harsh environment for electronics
and wireless communication in that there are a lot of moving
mechanical parts generating both interference and attenuating
radio signals. Wireless sensors have two distinct advantages:
the sensors can be put deep inside the engine where it is
infeasible to have cabling; and it removes the weight and
maintenance of cabling. The difficulty of maintenance may
also mean the designer may want to fit a number of replicas
so replacement is not necessary. Current engines have a
significant number of sensors (more than 10). With a shift
towards more intelligent control and monitoring this number
will grow. External to the engine there are a number of
controlled interference sources, e.g. from the rest of the
aircraft, and un-controlled interference sources, e.g.
high-intensity radiated fields including lightning, mobile
phones, laptops etc. This leads to complex fault behaviour
that cannot be fully defined at design time. We therefore
utilise a collection of fault models (one per criticality level)
that are, in themselves, bounded.
Finally, a number of parts of the overall aircraft system
(and logical support equipment on the ground) may want to
use wireless communications and as such the aircraft engine
should be designed to share the same parts of the spectrum
(e.g. two nodes concurrently wanting to send messages to
different destinations) especially as the whole aircraft could
have hundreds if not thousands of sensors.
A good example of the potential deployment of a wireless
communication media is within an aircraft engine for the
purposes of active health monitoring [33]. Figure 1 shows
the communication graph for a 25-node wireless network
inspired by a possible engine monitoring system; it is clear
that the topology of this example is a 5-node subsystem
repeated 5 times. We will use this 5-node subsystem to
illustrate the analysis associated with AirTight, and will
validate it using a prototype network of 5 IEEE
802.15.4-compliant nodes. We will then use a
protocol-accurate simulator to evaluate AirTight’s
performance and scalability over the complete 25-node
network. In total this network has 55 packet flows mapped to
the 25 nodes; 25 of these flows are defined to be of
HI-criticality and 30 of LO-criticality.
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Fig. 1. Communication Graph of a 25 node Health Monitoring System
III. RELATED WORK
In this section we consider wireless protocols that have been
designed to give time predictable behaviour, and protocols that
take into account mixed criticality. For information on more
general purpose protocols the interested reader may follow the
links from [25].
A. General Real-Time Protocols
WirelessHART [15] was developed as an extension of the
HART protocol [14] designed for wired communications in
industrial automation and process control scenarios. The
WirelessHART protocol extensions were intended to allow
mobile devices to attain the capabilities of HART networks.
WirelessHART employs a time-division multiple access
(TDMA) based MAC layer, with multi-hop routes centrally
planned and allocated by a sink which operates as a gateway
between the wireless network and external access network. A
similar TDMA approach is advocated by FireFly [24], [26].
One notable aspect of WirelessHART is the avoidance of
spatial reuse throughout the network, with only one
simultaneous transmission allowed at any time. Although
frequency reuse is permitted through the simultaneous use of
multiple channels, simultaneous transmissions on any one
channel are disallowed [29]. This avoids the problem of
detecting interference patterns and allows the network to be
stabilised, but limits scalability and restricts the viable range
of the network. In addition, alternative routes are required in
WirelessHART for redundant data transmission. By
comparison, our current work focuses entirely on avoiding
faults via temporal retransmission; that is, holding
transmissions within buffers and making repeated
transmissions of any failed transmission after a delay. We
note that the avionics use case described earlier has little
opportunity for exploiting spacial redundancy.
Saifullah [27] presents several approaches for scheduling
of multi-hop routing-centric wireless networks built upon
WirelessHART. Saifullah establishes that overall the wireless
scheduling problem is NP-hard, and then provides heuristics
to simplify the scheduling decisions. The first of these,
Conflict-Free Least-Laxity First (CLLF) [29] schedules
according to the laxity of the transmissions, that is the time
remaining until their deadlines. However, it guides the
scheduling process by focusing on conflicts, scheduling first
in hotspot areas in which conflicts are likely (e.g. around the
sink and congested frequently used devices). Flow set
evaluation results show that CLLF is several orders of
magnitude faster in determining schedulability than
exhaustive search, although run time does increase with
increased routing diversity. Saifullah et al. also present an
end-to-end delay analysis [30] for an application with fixed
priority flows, and extend this work to the case of graph
routing in [28].
A very different approach for broadcast wireless
communication is provided via Glossy [13], which attempts
to simultaneously achieve time synchronisation as well as
error tolerant communication via collaborative flooding of
data packets. If time synchronisation is sufficiently tight,
multiple nodes are able to receive packets and rebroadcast
them simultaneously. Glossy therefore uses spatial diversity
to compensate for any localised faults; it has been
successfully used as a primitive layer to build network
services such as LWB [12] and Blink [34]. However, the
drawbacks of Glossy include requirements for low-level
tuning of the code by inserting NOPs (no-operation opcodes)
to ensure correct timing. There are also security problems
such as the Arpeggio attack [17], in which an attacker is
able to hijack the flooding mechanism to broadcast attack
packets more widely.
B. Mixed Criticality Protocols and Applications
Several papers have focused on mixed criticality in WSNs
and CPSs. Alemayehu et al. [1] consider mixed-criticality
used for video transmission in a multimedia sensor network.
The paper uses different criticality levels for different
resolution video frames, to provide graceful degradation
under error by providing a low resolution alternative. They
focus on changing criticality in response to a reduction in
overall network bandwidth, and can discard data in response
to criticality and priority to improve overall performance. An
interesting contrast to our work is that the paper did not use
TDMA and a pure wireless topology but a hybrid
CSMA/CA over 802.11, yet still achieved end-to-end
response time reductions.
Shen et al. [31] present the PriorityMAC protocol. The
paper uses a concept of priority levels, but their definition
overlaps with criticality – the importance of reliable delivery
from the application perspective. It defines four traffic types
and requires windows at the start of every application
message for the two highest priority traffic levels to reserve
capacity. Nodes must listen to these windows and detect
them as clear if they wish to transmit the two highest
priority traffic types. This allows dynamic adjustments in
priority by allowing nodes with higher priority traffic to use
slots previously assigned to other nodes, but at the cost of
channel capacity reductions. Moreover, their analysis and
evaluation only considers average-case latencies and does not
provide a worst-case guarantee.
Jin et al. [21] considers delay analysis for WirelessHART
networks supporting mixed criticality under fixed priorities.
An interesting aspect of their model is that they assume a
global network criticality level, and a broadcast mechanism
to signal a criticality mode change similar to
WPMC-FLOOD [19] within a network-on-chip (NoC).
However, they do not specify any low level router behaviour
to achieve the change, merely assuming the change takes a
maximum defined time. It does not appear to use criticality
monotonic arbitration, instead assuming that the
LO-criticality flows are dropped rather than buffered, due to
the low memory of the devices.
StealRM [20] is an alternative protocol which provides
redundancy and is employed for HI-criticality flows, with the
transmissions of HI-criticality packets along two duplicate
routes to protect against interference or damage to one copy.
The algorithm centrally establishes schedules for both the
LO and HI-criticality flows, but allows nodes to make the
distributed decisions for transmission of HI-criticality in
place of a LO-criticality when required. This is done by
means of a clear channel assessment performed by the radio
before making every LO-criticality transmission, which
ensures that interference is avoided. Therefore, LO-criticality
packets may be destroyed when HI-criticality packets require
the resource, referred to as slot stealing. This approach is
similar to the approach of Shen et al. with
PriorityMAC [31], since it allows nodes to request additional
capacity dynamically.
Dimopoulos et al. [11] consider mixed criticality systems,
specifically for smart building infrastructure. One interesting
aspect they mention is the potential use of software defined
radios in the implementation of CPS, in order to present
more adaptability in the behaviour and protocols employed.
In nodes with more resources than conventional WSN motes
this may be a viable solution. They also consider mixed
criticality in wireless systems to require levels of
autonomous management in different regions, contrasting
with the implicitly centralised management and
routing-centric designs required for WirelessHART (and
assumed in the extensive scheduling studies performed
in [27]).
In summary, by comparison with the above approaches,
AirTight is the first mixed-criticality wireless protocol that
incorporates local scheduling decisions and which delivers
time-bounded performance that is sensitive to whatever fault
model is deemed appropriate for the system under
consideration.
IV. FAULT MODEL
A wireless network, even in a protected domain, will suffer
interference that will result in some packets being corrupted. A
predictable network can only be derived and analysed if there
is a bound on the level of interference suffered by each node in
the system. This bound is usually expressed as a fault model.
If the level of interference is no worse than that implied by the
fault model then temporal guarantees can be made. The quality
of the fault model can itself be modelled using a probabilistic
estimate of the likelihood of exceeding a given fault severity
during, say, an hour of operation [7]. With mixed-criticality
systems the required quality will vary with criticality; so for
a LO-criticality transmission the fault model may bound the
number of deadlines misses to be no more than 1 in 1,000,
for a HI-criticality transmission this number may be extended
to 1 in 1,000,000.
In general a node will suffer interference from a number
of different sources. Each source will produce a pattern of
interference. Moreover, in a geographically spread network
each node will experience different levels of interference
from different sources. To model a particular node’s (nk)
level of interference we need a fault load function, Fk. This
function, when given an interval of duration t, will return the
level of interference assumed by the fault model for this
node at criticality level, L; i.e. the function is defined as
Fk(L, t). As the basic time unit in the analysis model is the
duration, S, of a single slot, both t and Fk are represented as
an integer multiple of S.
We note that the fault model is always assumed to be more
severe for HI-criticality packets than for LO-criticality packets.
Hence we require that:
∀t, ∀nk : Fk(HI, t) ≥ Fk(LO, t)
The function Fk can be decomposed into a combination of
fault load functions (fk) for each of the w sources of
interference:
Fk(L, t) = GL{f
1
k (L, t), f
2
k (L, t), . . . , f
w
k (L, t)}
where GL is a criticality-specific application-defined means of
combining the different sources of interference.
So, for example, for LO-criticality packets GLO may be
defined to be the MAX operator, and hence at this criticality
level the node is assumed to only suffer interference from
one source at a time – but the maximum possible single level
is used to define Fk. For HI-criticality packets GHI may be
defined to be the SUM operator, and hence all sources are
assumed to contribute their maximum levels – a situation that
may be impossible as interference is not cumulative.
The most straightforward way of representing a single
source of interference fk is via a duration and a frequency.
So a single corruption could cause a blackout for duration
b(L), with the minimum time between faults: T b(L). Note
these parameters are functions of criticality level and are
measured in units of S. A single source of interference
could, for instance, be modelled by b(LO) = 4,
T b(LO) = 100, b(HI) = 6, T b(HI) = 80: for LO-criticality
transmissions this interference is assumed to last up to 4
units of time and repeat every 100 units; but for
HI-criticality transmissions a more severe view is taken, the
blackout can last 6 units of time and repeat every 80 units.
For an actual deployment of AirTight various signal
processing schemes (for example Fourier Analysis) are
available that allow the overall interference experienced at a
node to be decomposed into component sources defined by
these two parameters. These are statistical methods and
hence the parameters derived are a functions of the level of
confidence required. Higher levels of criticality will require
higher levels of confidence and hence more conservative
parameters will be obtained.
In this paper we do not address further this analysis of
actual interference, rather we assume that by the time an
implementation requires analysis the necessary fault load
functions have been obtained. All that the analysis requires
is that Fk(L, t) is defined for all t and for each criticality
level contained in the system.
V. THE AIRTIGHT PROTOCOL
In general a wireless network can be characterised by a
number of properties:
• Single-hop or multi-hop (i.e. is the communications graph
fully connected?).
• Single-domain or multi-domain (i.e. is the interference
graph fully connected?).
• Single-channel or multi-channel.
In this first paper on AirTight we focus on multi-hop,
single-domain, single-channel networks. With a single-
domain, single-channel network, assuming that all nodes
listen in all slots, a single table specifying which node may
transmit in each slot is sufficient to define the behaviour of
all nodes. The extension to multi-domain does not introduce
any fundamental issues, but requires the construction of
multiple tables. We also assume that the allocation of tasks
and sensors/actuators to nodes has already been undertaken
and hence that the sets of packet flows (and their
destinations) for each node are fixed and known.
The protocol has three main phases:
1) The construction of the slot table. This is derived from
the requirements of all the packet flows on all the nodes.
The table is communicated to all nodes during system
initialisation.
2) The run-time local scheduling of flows. Each node will,
independently, make use of the slots allocated to it. This
will take account of priorities, errors, and
re-transmissions.
3) An adaptive system will, over time, look to modify the
slot table – for example there could be free slots that
nodes compete for, or unused slots that are reallocated,
or potentially the complete table could change due to a
system mode change.
In this paper, and the prototype implementation, a simple
heuristic is used to construct the table, and the third phase
(adaptation) is left for future work.
Analysis is used on each node to check for packet flow
schedulability. This requires knowledge of the slot table;
however, the structure of the slot table is itself a function of
the schedulability of all nodes. In Section VI we first derive
analysis, assuming a known slot table, and then show how
the slot table can be constructed with a simple heuristic. In
future work we intend to make use of a search-based
algorithm (e.g. a genetic algorithm or simulated annealing)
to: construct near-optimal slot table layouts, cover all
required routing decisions, and cater for multi-domain and
multi-channel systems.
A schedulable AirTight network behaves as follows:
• If there are no faults experienced by the system then all
packets will meet their deadlines.
• If the faults experienced by the system are no worse than
that implied by the LO-criticality fault model then all
packets will meet their deadlines.
• If the faults experienced by the system are no worse than
that implied by the HI-criticality fault model then all HI-
criticality packets will meet their deadlines.
• If the faults experienced by the system are worse than
that implied by the HI-criticality fault model then each
node will apply a best-effort approach. The faults are
deemed to be beyond the level at which guarantees can
be provided.
Following the behaviour of mixed criticality task
scheduling [4], three modes of operation are defined. Each
node is, independently, in either LO-criticality, HI-criticality
or Best-Effort mode. In the LO-criticality mode all of the
node’s packets are sent and they are delivered by their
deadlines. If the LO-criticality fault model is exceeded, then
the node moves to HI-criticality mode. In this mode,
LO-criticality packets are abandoned (or moved to local
background priority); however, all HI-criticality packets are
still delivered by their deadlines. If the HI-criticality fault
model is exceeded, then the node moves to Best-Effort
mode. At any time that the output buffer of the node is
empty the node can return to LO-criticality mode. (This is
equivalent to the return to LO-criticality mode on an
idle-tick in task scheduling).
A. Jitter Elimination
Usually with distributed systems it is assumed that the
packets inherit significant release jitter from the variability in
the completion times of the tasks that generate them. This
jitter can then be factored into the response-time analysis [3].
Here we apply a protocol that eliminates release jitter whilst
not extending the worst-case overall (i.e. end-to-end)
response-time [10]. Release jitter is eliminated by the
following protocol which is applied to all frames of all
packets. For clarity we describe its application to a single
frame f of a single packet flow τi. The time q when frame f
of the first packet of packet flow τi is received by node nk is
recorded. When at a later time t the node receives frame f
of the next packet of the same packet flow, then: (i) if
t ≥ q+ Ti, then the frame is immediately eligible for onward
transmission by nk and q is set to t; (ii) if t < q + Ti, then
the frame is held (i.e. delayed) and is not eligible for further
transmission along its route by nk until time q + Ti is
reached. At that point q is set to q + Ti. The same process is
repeated for subsequent frames f of all packets of that flow.
This protocol also applies to frames “received” by the source
node from the sending task, with the initial maximum jitter
due to the sending task (i.e. its worst-case response time)
deducted from the end-to-end deadline. The effect of the
protocol is to eliminate the interference effects of jitter, and
thereby improve schedulability.
VI. AIRTIGHT ANALYSIS
The starting point for the analysis of a complete system is a
set of packet flows with Destination and Source nodes directly
linked in the communications graph. In other words, all routing
requirements have been met by the addition of intermediate
flows passing between connected nodes (we revisit this issue
as part of the slot table construction heuristic – see Section
VII). We also assume local priorities have been assigned to
all packet flows (an optimal assignment can be obtained by
applying Audsley’s algorithm [2]).
For any particular phase of the analysis the slot table is
known. It has duration TSL (measured in slots). Each node
has one or more slots within the table; let this allocation be
represented by ai We have (note, as before, N is the number
of nodes in the system):∑
j∈N
aj = TSL
The required analysis is obtained from adapting three
schemes/notions:
• Modelling the impact of faults by a fault load
function(Fk(L, t)), which gives the maximum number
of failed slots for criticality level L in time t for node
nk.
• Basic fixed-priority analysis for mixed-criticality task
scheduling – using the AMC approach [4].
• Modelling the supply function (S(X)), the maximum
time which the slot table can take to supply X slots to
the node.
A. AMC Analysis for AirTight
The AMC analysis for a collection of tasks exploits the
fact that the load on the system is lighter during the
LO-criticality mode, and the fact that LO-criticality tasks are
dropped once the system transitions to HI-criticality mode.
With task scheduling the load is less in the LO-criticality
mode as tasks have smaller worst-case execution time
estimates in that mode [32]. When analysing packet flows,
this is not the case (although the model could easily be
extended to include this). Rather it is the fault load that is
lower in the LO-criticality mode. This allows us to define
response-time analysis for each packet flow, τi on node nk.
In the LO-criticality mode:
Ri(LO) = Ci +Fk(LO,Ri(LO)) +
∑
j∈hp(i)
⌈
Ri(LO)
Tj
⌉
Cj
(1)
where hp(i) is the set of all local (i.e. also transmitted by
node nk on part of their route) flows with priority higher than
that of τi.
In the HI-criticality mode:
Ri(HI) = Ci + Fk(HI,Ri(HI)) +
∑
τj∈hpH(i)
⌈
Ri(HI)
Tj
⌉
Cj +
∑
τk∈hpL(i)
⌈
Ri(LO)
Tk
⌉
Ck (2)
where hpH(i) is the set of local HI-criticality packet flows
with priority higher than that of flow τi; and hpL(i) is the set
of local LO-criticality packet flows with priority higher than
that of flow τi. Note Ri(HI) is only defined for packet flows
of HI-criticality.
B. Sufficient Analysis for AirTight
The above analysis assumes that the required resources (the
slots of the slot table) are always available for the node under
investigation. This is a valid assumption for tasks executing
on a single processor, since the processor is always available.
With AirTight the slots are not as readily available. Indeed, as
few as one in TSL slots may be all that is available for the node
under investigation. We therefore represent the availability of
slots as a supply function: Sk(X), which provides an upper
bound on the time it will take for X slots to be available for
node nk. Equation (1) is now split into two parts:
X = Ci +Fk(LO, Sk(X)) +
∑
j∈hp(i)
⌈
Sk(X)
Tj
⌉
Cj (3)
with
Ri(LO) = Sk(X) (4)
The equations are solved via fixed point iteration in the
usual way, starting with an initial value of X of Ci. Iteration
continues until either the value of X converges, in which
case Ri(LO) gives the worse-case response-time, or Ri(LO)
exceeds Di, in which case the packet flow is not schedulable.
Similarly equation (2) becomes
X = Ci + Fk(HI, Sk(X)) +
∑
τj∈hpH(i)
⌈
Sk(X)
Tj
⌉
Cj+
∑
τk∈hpL(i)
⌈
Ri(LO)
Tk
⌉
Ck (5)
with
Ri(HI) = Sk(X) (6)
An example of the application of this analysis is given in
Section VIII.
A number of different formulas for Sk(X) are possible.
When node nk has only one slot in the table (ak = 1) then it
must be assumed that the worst-case possible phasing between
this slot and the packet flow under consideration occurs. This
implies that a frame of the packet flow arrives just after the slot
has been assigned to a lower priority packet, or indeed a null
or background packet is assigned. Hence there is a ‘blocking
time’ of 1 slot. Minor clock drift is also accommodated within
this blocking term.
If no internal structure for the table is known then a
sufficient model for the supply function is
Sk(X) = 1 +
⌈
X
ak
⌉
TSL
So, for example, if the table is of length of six and a node
has one slot within the table, then the supply function returns
7 for S(1), 13 for S(2) and so on. Similarly if the node has
two slots in the table, then its conservative supply function
is S(1) = S(2) = 7, S(3) = S(4) = 13. If the internal
structure of the table is known, then a less pessimistic estimate
is possible. For example, the two slots cannot both come at the
end of the table, so an improvement is S(1) = 6, S(2) = 7,
S(3) = 12, S(4) = 13 etc. Moreover, if the table is known to
have allocated the two slots to positions (1 and 4, or 2 and 5, or
3 and 6) then the supply function becomes: S(1) = 4, S(2) =
7, S(3) = 10 etc. This latter supply function dominates the
more pessimistic ones discussed above, since it provides the
same number of available slots in the same or less time, for
any number of required slots.
C. Priority Assignment
Each node has a separate priority-ordered output buffer for
its frames. An optimal priority ordering for this buffer can
be obtained by applying Audsley’s algorithm [2]. The
applicability of this algorithm comes directly from the fact
that the scheduling scheme being applied is equivalent
(indeed identical) to that employed in mixed-criticality task
scheduling.
VII. SLOT TABLE CONSTRUCTION
In this section we describe a simple heuristic for
constructing an appropriate slot table; however, first the issue
of packet routing must be considered. In general routing
must be addressed as part of the mapping of an application
to the available hardware. Here we again take a simpler
approach.
1) The shortest route between Source and Destination is
chosen (an arbitrary choice is made if there is more
than one route with the same length).
2) The deadline of the packet is partitioned between each
hop of the route, and priorities assigned by applying
Audsley’s algorithm [2].
3) Response times are computed for each hop and summed
to obtain the end-to-end response-time that is then
compared with the end-to-end deadline.
4) Initially the packet deadline is divided equally between
the hops, if any hop is unschedulable (i.e. R > D) its
deadline is increased (to R, but not exceeding T ) (while
others are decreased when R < D ).
Clearly this is a non-optimal approach. Although the
heuristic does account for ‘busy’ nodes by allowing them to
have more slots in the table (see below). As indicated earlier,
under future work we aim to explore the use of a
search-based algorithm to deal with routing, table
construction, non-interfering flows and multiple channels.
The purpose of the current paper is to give a definition of
the protocol, the derivation of its enabling analysis and argue
for the feasibility of the protocol via a complete
proof-of-concept prototype.
The following steps are undertaken to construct a slot table.
Here we aim to derive a small slot table (ST) that delivers
schedulability for all nodes. (Note, we do not claim that the
size of the slot table is necessarily minimized).
1) Collect the set of flow requirements for each node.
2) Add multi-hop routing flows where appropriate.
3) Initiate the slot table to have length TST = N , where N
is the number of nodes in the system.
4) Assuming each node has one slot in the table of length
N , check for local schedulability of all nodes. If any node
is not locally schedulable, compute how many extra slots
that node would require in the table.
5) Extend the size of the table to accommodate these extra
slots.
6) Repeat the schedulability test for all nodes with the longer
table.
7) Repeat this process (testing and extending the table)
until either all nodes are schedulable with the new table
size, or the table keeps growing until ‘unschedulability’
is declared if the table grows to beyond the
hyper-period of all the flows.
VIII. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section we analyse a simple five node example
which is motivated by the subsystem identified in the
avionics use case (as illustrated in Figure 1). The 5 nodes
(which are the central group in Figure 1) are depicted in
Figure 2 and form a star topology: n1, n2 ↔ n0 ↔ n3, n4.
So n0 can communicate directly with all nodes; but n1, for
example, can only communicate with n2 and n0, and not
with n3 or n4. However, we assume conservatively that the
interference graph of the system is complete such that all
nodes may potentially interfere with each other, even though
they may be out of range for intelligible communication.
Therefore, we do not allow node n1 to transmit to n2 at the
same time as n3 transmits to n4. We use periods and
deadlines that are 1/5 of those of the larger example as this
allows the tightness of the analysis to be illustrated in this
section. It also means that the full 25 node example is
obviously schedulable if this subsystem is.
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Fig. 2. Diagram of the nodes and communicating packet flows
There are nine end-to-end packet flows of two criticality
types. Two packet flows must be routed through n0; these are
accommodated by simply, for this example of the analysis,
dividing the deadline in two. This results in eleven packet
flows that are given in Table I (where P is the local priority,
with 1 being the highest)
For this simple example we assume a single source of
interference; the fault model is defined as follows:
1) For b = 5 and T b = 100, all deadlines must be met
2) For b = 15 and T b = 100, the deadlines of all
HI-criticality flows must be met
3) For b > 15 and any T b < 100, best effort – send
HI-criticality packets when possible, perhaps using a
secondary parameter (importance) to order local access.
If we start with a table of length 5 with all nodes having
a single slot then n1, n2, n3, and n4 are schedulable, but n0
is not. However, if the table length is increased to 6 with n0
having two slots then all nodes are schedulable. Worst-case
response times are given in Table I. These invariably occur
following faults of the worst possible magnitude (as defined
by the fault model). Note that no assumptions have been made
about where in the table any node’s particular slot(s) actually
are positioned. We use a simple formulation of the analysis,
the supply function for all nodes apart from n0 is 1 in 7, 2 in
13, 3 in 19 etc. For n0 it is 2 in 7, 4 in 13, 6 in 19, 8 in 25,
10 in 31 and 12 in 37.
To give an example of the analysis; consider τ5 which is
the lowest priority packet flow on node n0. It is a
HI-criticality flow but first its worst-case response-time in
the LO-criticality mode must be computed. Using equations
(3) and (4) we initially have X = 3 and R5(LO) = 13. Now
equation (3) becomes:
X = 3 + F5(LO, 13) +
⌈
13
26
⌉
1 +
⌈
13
64
⌉
1
Name From To Criticality T D C P R
τ1 n1 n2 LO 30 30 2 2 25
τ2 n1 n0 LO 26 13 1 1 13
τ3 n2 n0 HI 40 40 1 2 31
τ4 n2 n0 LO 13 13 1 1 13
τ5 n0 n4 HI 38 38 3 3 37
τ6 n0 n4 LO 26 13 1 1 13
τ7 n0 n1 HI 64 32 1 2 31
τ8 n3 n4 LO 32 14 1 1 13
τ9 n3 n0 HI 64 32 1 2 31
τ10 n3 n0 LO 32 32 2 3 31
τ11 n4 n0 HI 40 40 2 1 31
TABLE I
EXAMPLE, PARAMETERS AND RESPONSE-TIME CALCULATIONS
F5(LO, 13) is 2, since one table is corrupted within which
there are two slots, hence X becomes 7 and R5(LO) = 25.
At this point, iteration has converged, as the value of X does
not change when 13 is replaced by 25.
To compute R5(HI) we can start with a value of 25 so
equation (5) becomes:
X = 3 + F5(HI, 25) +
⌈
25
26
⌉
1 +
⌈
25
64
⌉
1
The fault load, F5(HI, 25) is now 6 (three tables corrupted),
so X = 11 and R5(HI) = 37. Another iteration gives:
X = 3 + F5(HI, 37) +
⌈
25
26
⌉
1 +
⌈
37
64
⌉
1
which is again 11; so R5(HI) has converged to 37. Note the
interval for interference from the LO-criticality packet flow
τ6 is capped at 25, which is the response-time of τ5 in LO-
criticality mode (i.e. R5(LO)).
This example is used as the basis for the experiments
undertaken on the prototype implementation of AirTight
described in Section IX. In the prototype one slot per table
was required for clock synchronisation. To keep the table
size at 6, all the packet flows on node 0 would need to be
schedulable with an allocation of only 1 in 5, but as
illustrated above, an allocation of 1 in 5 is not sufficient (it
requires 2 in 6). However, a simple modification to the
example (extending τ5’s period and deadline to 55) does
deliver a schedulable node with an allocation of 1 in 6. In
this case, R6 and R7 remain unchanged (at 13 and 31
respectively), but R5 is now 55.
IX. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION OF AIRTIGHT
The prototype CPS implementation is based on IEEE
802.15.4-compliant node hardware (the Iris XM-2110 nodes
[18] manufactured by Crossbow Technology) and the
TinyOS version 2 operating system [22] as obtained from the
development repository in July 2017 [9]. This section
describes the decisions we made to implement the protocol
services defined in Section V.
The core of the MAC services are built on several TinyOS
components from the tinyos-contrib repository [8]. Firstly,
the Slotter, SlotterControl and FrameConfiguration interfaces,
and GenericSlotter components are used to implement the
timeslot management service. The prototype implementation
of the time synchronisation service uses one of the table
slots to transmit a beacon frame, but this is an
implementation decision and not a fundamental requirement
for the protocol. For the application described in Section
VIII, the slot table is 6 slots long; slot 1 is designated for
time synchronisation (via a broadcast beacon frame) and the
remaining 5 slots for AirTight application data. The Iris node
RF230 radio transceiver can provide, to a transmitting node,
a hardware acknowledgement of frames received correctly by
the recipient node, which we used to implement the
acknowledged frame delivery service.
The prototyped application is as described in Section VIII,
although it is modified to operate with five data slots in the
table, with the change of τ5’s period and deadline to 55 as
described in the last paragraph of Section VIII.
The prototype implements the node criticality level
management service, and its interaction with the
priority-based frame scheduler, according to the following
rules:
M0 The counter of ACK failures, for the node, is
initialised to zero. The node’s mode is initialised to
LO-criticality.
M1 Every time a node fails to receive an
acknowledgement for a transmission, its failed
ACK counter is incremented.
M2 When the failed ACK counter reaches a predefined
value (which is 2 in the experiments described
below), the criticality mode flag of the transmitting
node is set to HI-criticality mode. On transitioning
to the HI-criticality mode, the contents of
LO-criticality buffers are discarded/flushed.
M3 While in the HI-criticality mode, newly arriving LO-
criticality transmission requests (for the transmission
of new packets) are ignored.
M4 While in the LO-criticality mode, the highest priority
frame is selected for transmission when there is a slot
available.
M5 While in the HI-criticality mode, the highest priority
HI-criticality frame is selected for transmission.
M6 The node returns to its LO-criticality mode when all
its HI-criticality buffers are empty. The ACK failure
counter is also reset to zero.
M7 If the failed ACK counter reaches a second
predefined value (which is 4 in the experiments
described below) then the system is deemed to have
moved beyond its HI-criticality fault model – in
this situation the prototype implementation flushes
all buffers and resets the ACK count to zero and
the node mode to LO-criticality.
A. Scenario and Data Gathering
Five nodes are configured as standard nodes to implement
the AirTight protocol. One of the participating nodes (node 0)
is connected to a computer (see Figure 3), while the remaining
nodes receive their power either through onboard batteries or
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Fig. 3. Logical network structure for the experiments, showing monitoring
node M and computer C
USB power via a programming board.
In order to gather necessary experimental data, an external
node is connected as a monitoring node. This node operates
in snooping mode which permits it to observe all the packets
transmitted throughout the network. This monitoring node is
entirely passive; it does not participate in data transmission
via the AirTight protocol described in this paper, but merely
listens constantly to the channel and records all of the
AirTight packets observed. This is used during the
experiments to collect performance statistics. During
protocol operation, nodes maintain a running 16-bit counter
of their slot number, and record both the slot number when
each packet is generated, and the slot number of its
transmission. This allows the response time of the received
packets to be determined on the monitoring computer.
X. SIMULATION
In order to perform more extensive and controlled
performance assessments for AirTight, an abstract simulation
model of the protocol was developed. The simulator is a
discrete-event simulator similar in concept to [23] which
models the generation of application data, protocol rules and
the transmission of individual frames across the network.
The simulator provides a time slotted MAC protocol layer
arranged in a repeating slot table similar to that described in
Section IX. Although time synchronisation is not required
due to the absence of any clock drift, one slot is also
reserved to time synchronisation for consistency with the
prototype implementation. Faults can be injected of varying
length and periodicity, allowing the behaviour of the protocol
under faults to be tested. The simulator provides a simple
channel model with either guaranteed delivery between
connected nodes, or discarding of the packets, depending on
the fault model in use during an experiment.
For the simulated flow set and topology, two alternatives
are available. The 5-node, 11-flow case as described in
Section IX-A is simulated in the same configurations as the
implementation. A larger case study was also created,
consisting of five repeated copies of the standard topology,
as depicted earlier in Figure 1.
XI. EXPERIMENTATION
To perform an experiment, first the system nodes are
programmed with the appropriate settings; for example: node
ID, slot configuration, and the parameters for their active
packet flows. Then the listener node is activated and
connected over USB. The listener node monitors the network
in snooping mode, and the connected computer processes
this information to produce the results, such as the flow
latency between injection and transmission and the number
of LO criticality flows which were discarded due to the
protocol rules.
The results in the case with no explicit fault injection are
presented in Figure 4. The background bars indicate the
worst-case response-time of each packet flow as derived by
the analysis given in Section VIII. The scatter plots indicate
for each flow the distribution of timings (in slots) between
injection by the application and transmission for each flow.
The results are broken down first by per flow ID and, second
by the number of retransmissions for each packet. The HI
and LO criticality flows are grouped together. The data in
Figure 4 is obtained from a single (though typical)
experimental run lasting 5 hours.
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Fig. 4. Timing results with no deliberately injected faults (office environment)
The most important observation is that under these
conditions, all HI-criticality and LO-criticality transmission
times are below their analytically computed response time
bounds. It is notable that even without the intentional
injection of faults, occasionally some HI-criticality packets
experienced multiple retransmissions. This occurs because of
the office environment in which the experiments were
undertaken. The frequency band used was subject to
interference from wireless access points and other network
users, thus some retransmissions were required as part of
normal system operation. Although all transmitted flows met
their deadlines, some LO-criticality flows were dropped (as
the protocol requires in order to ensure the HI-criticality
flow can have up to three re-tries). In the experiment
reported in Figure 4 the six LO-criticality flows (1, 2, 4, 6,
8, and 10) have 0.19%, 0.34%, 0.90%, 3.88%, 0.21% and
0.83% of their flows dropped.
The simulation results in the presence of the controlled
injection of faults are illustrated here showing simulated
performance of the larger 25 node example in the presence
of various levels of faults. These graphs contain less data per
flow as there as now 55 flows.
As the 25 node system is in essence composed of 5 copies
of the subsystem analysed earlier (though with periods and
deadlines 5 times greater than those give in Table I), the
analysis indicates that a slots table of length 30 delivers a
schedulable system. Each simulation lasted for the
hyper-period of the 55 flows (several hours of real-time,
simulation time approximately 20 seconds).
We noted that in the presence of a single table fault
repeated no closer than every 500 slots, all LO-criticality
flows meet their deadlines and are within the analytically
calculated response times, and all flows are delivered. In the
presence of longer faults of up to 3 tables in duration (see
Figure 5) some of the LO-criticality transmissions have to be
discarded in order to meet the deadlines of the HI-criticality
packets, although for the transmitted packets, all the
deadlines are met. This is illustrated in Figure 5. In all,
17.18% of the LO-criticality flows were dropped.
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Fig. 5. Simulation – Faults within the HI-criticality Fault Model
XII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have demonstrated the feasibility of a
protocol for wireless communication that is intended for use
in time-critical cyber-physical systems. Various levels of
faults (both in duration and frequency) are characterised
within a fault model. Packet flows themselves are
characterised by their criticality (as well as the usual
parameters of deadline, size and minimum inter-arrival time).
At run-time, performance is guaranteed in the sense that
criticality and fault model are combined to give assurances
of the form: if the faults experience by the system are below
a certain level (as defined in the fault model) then all packets
at or above a specified criticality level will be delivered by
their deadlines.
The proposed AirTight protocol is motivated and defined in
this paper, analysis is derived and a prototype implementation
and protocol-accurate simulator are described. Experiments on
the prototype and simulator demonstrate the feasibility of the
protocol in practice and provide evidence of the soundness
(and tightness) of the analysis.
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